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TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER IN NEW MEXICO, TEXAS,
AND MEXICO: STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL REMEDIES TO A
CHALLENGE BETWEEN CITIES, STATES, AND NATIONS
JENNIFER EVANS*
INTRODUCTION
Natural resources are not always abundant and rarely obey
political boundaries, making legal challenges common and allo-
cation agreements necessary.' Traditionally, states have called
upon the federal government when transboundary legal challenges
arise, which have included everything from seeking approval of
interstate compacts to litigating in the federal courts.2 For
example, rivers crossing the United States-Mexico border have
been governed by bilateral treaties since the nineteenth century
and the federal government has set up binational programs to
address the allocation of river water.3 Allocation of groundwater
* Jennifer Evans is a 2006 J.D. candidate at the William and Mary School of
Law. Ms. Evans received a B.A. in Government from New Mexico State
University. The author would like to thank the editorial staff for all their
support and assistance in preparing this Note for publication.
1 See generally JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY (Foundation Press 2004); id. at 36 ("Scarcity is
perhaps the most basic feature of any natural resource conflict for the simple
reason that if the resource were not scarce there would be no need for
governmental intervention.. ").
2 See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas was
entitled to an equitable apportionment of benefits of the Arkansas River); Arizona
v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (approving the congressional apportionment of
water between states); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (holding that the
interstate compact between Texas and New Mexico was subject to federal court
jurisdiction absent other equivalent methods). See generally RASBANDETAL., supra
note 1, at 848-66 (describing three methods of allocation available to states:
judicial allocation, compact, and congressional allocation).
3 See, e.g., Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of
the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953; Treaty Relating to the
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on the United States-Mexico border, however, currently lacks a
solid legal agreement. 4
For decades scholars have expressed concern about the lack
of transboundary groundwater management and have tried to
resolve the inconsistency.5 Proposals such as bringing groundwater
within the jurisdiction of existing federal agencies and forming
bilateral treaties between the United States and Mexico have been
suggested.6 These solutions all have one thing in common: The
federal government is a key actor.
Groundwater management on the United States-Mexico
border presents both national and foreign policy issues; thus, federal
involvement in any agreement governing this groundwater seems
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande and
Supplementary Protocol, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 14, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219,3 U.N.T.S. 313.
The International Boundary and Water Commission was originally established
in 1889 for the purposes of applying the water treaties between the United
States and Mexico, and adopting subsequent agreements with Mexico in the
form of minutes. See id. arts. 24-25.
4 See Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of
International Groundwater Policy Along the United States-Mexico Border and
a Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2004); Stephen
P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities for
Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 341, 363-77 (2000) (setting forth a table describing the "Location,
Allocation, Utilization, [and] Problems" of all aquifers on the United States-
Mexico border).
5 ALBERT E. UTrON & CLIFFORD K. ATKINSON, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES FRONTIER, 72-73 (New
Mexico Water Resources Research Institute, Rep. No. 109 (Oct. 1979));
Hardberger, supra note 4, at 1215; Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 1212.
'See Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The
Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989) (proposing a treaty);
Ann Berkeley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Rclating
to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1985)
(proposing a treaty); Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool For
Solving Border Groundwater Issues, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 57 (2003) (suggesting the
Bellagio Draft Treaty as an appropriate structure for managing the region's
groundwater); Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 341 (advancing the idea
that existing structures might be able to draft agreements, but ultimately a
comprehensive groundwater agreement will be necessary).
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necessary. The negative impacts of inadequate groundwater
management, however, would be felt the most by the local citizens
who rely upon the water source for drinking water, crop irrigation,
and other imperative activities. Thus, state and local governments,
whose citizens will be affected daily by groundwater choices, should
have control over the destiny of local aquifers and the ability to
negotiate directly with Mexico. Although State and local govern-
ments are generally thought to be restricted from participating in
foreign relations, they are becoming more active in international
matters without federal oversight. Additionally, the current consti-
tutional doctrine arguably does not preclude such regional agree-
ments. Thus, a regional agreement between Mexico and a state or
local government that shares the aquifers is both a reasonable and
constitutional alternative for managing groundwater on the border.
Part I of this Note discusses the groundwater challenges
facing the region of Las Cruces, New Mexico; El Paso, Texas; and
Juarez, Mexico; and the reasons that transboundary groundwater
has been such a challenge to manage.7 This section also discusses
the different federal solutions that scholars have suggested for a
legal response to the problems of groundwater scarcity.8 Part II
discusses the role of state and local governments in foreign affairs.9
This Part begins by summarizing Supreme Court cases addressing
whether the constitution permits states to act in ways that impact
foreign nations. It goes on to discuss the extent to which state and
local governments are currently engaged in foreign affairs. Finally,
Part III discusses whether local and state solutions are legal and
appropriate measures to address the groundwater situation on
the border.1 ° Part III asserts that, absent federal oversight or
Congressional consent, the Constitution permits regional ground-
water agreements between Mexico and state or local governments.
7 See infra Part I.
1ld.
9 See infra Part II.
'o See infra Part III.
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I. GROUNDWATER ALONG THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO
BORDER
Groundwater along the United States-Mexico border is both
scarce and necessary. As the aquifers dry up, however, no legal
agreement between the two countries allocates the remaining
water and prevents future harm to the public health, the environ-
ment, and the economy. This is the situation in the areas of El
Paso, Las Cruces, Ciudad Juarez, and seventeen other areas along
the border." This section will describe the groundwater concerns
in the regions of El Paso, Las Cruces, and Ciudad Juarez, the
challenges that arise when considering a legal agreement, and the
federal solutions that have been proposed to deal with this
important issue.
A. Groundwater Concerns
The cities of Las Cruces, El Paso, and Ciudad Juarez rely on
two main aquifers: the Hueco Bolson and the Mesilla Bolson."2 The
Hueco Bolson l3 provides El Paso with sixty percent of its municipal
water supply and Ciudad Juarez with one-hundred percent of its
water supply. 4 Scientists, using the current pumping rates,
estimate that the Hueco Bolson will run out of "economically
recoverable freshwater supplies" by 2025.15 As of 1995, the Mesilla
Bolson 16 provided El Paso with about eighteen percent of its water
11 Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 344.
12 Octavio E. Chvez, Mining of Internationally Shared Aquifers: The El Paso-
Juarez Case, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 237, 239 (2000).
13 The Hueco Bolson is located within New Mexico, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez,
and is a water source for all three areas. Id.
14 Id.; Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 374.
" Bill Hume, Water in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 189,
191 (2000); United States Bureau of Reclamation, El Paso Field Division, Desert
Blooms, Regional Water Sources Overview, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/apps/dblooms/
pages/Sources.jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (case sensitive) [hereinafter USBRI.
16 The Mesilla Bolson lies mainly within Texas and New Mexico, with small portions
in Mexico. See Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 373; USBR, supra note 15.
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and has been a water source for Las Cruces for over fifty years. 7
Additionally, in the year 2000, Ciudad Juarez began a project of
building twenty-five wells to the Mesilla Bolson with prospects of
pumping additional water from there.'" The Mesilla Bolson is re-
charged by surface water, meaning that the aquifer is renewable
and has a more constant water level than the Hueco Bolson, but
significant water withdrawal from the aquifer already results in a
decline in water quality. 9 Because the amount of clean water avail-
able in the region's aquifers is limited, a legal battle to allocate the
water between the three entities is a true and current concern.2 °
The groundwater problem in this border region is further
exacerbated by rising populations, overdraft of the water source,2'
and increased development.22 Today, almost two million people
reside in the area, with most growth occurring in recent decades.23
Between 1960 and 1995, the population in El Paso grew from
276,687 to 600,000 people, and the population in Ciudad Juarez
17 USBR, supra note 15. Las Cruces uses the water in the Mesilla Bolson
primarily for agricultural purposes, while El Paso uses its water primarily for
municipal purposes. Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 373.
18 Id.
19 See USBR, supra note 15; Chdvez, supra note 12, at 239; Mumme, Minute 242,
supra note 4, at 373.20 UTTON & ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 72-73. Over twenty years ago Utton and
Atkinson claimed "at some point [depletion of the groundwater] inevitably would
lead to conflict between the two countries which, if not settled amicably by
agreement, might be taken to the International Court of Justice or an arbitral
tribunal." Id.
21 The term overdraft means "withdrawing water from an aquifer at a rate faster
than its natural, or artificial, recharge rate. If this practice continues for a long
period of time, or if the aquifer has limited or little recharge, overdrafting is
called mining." Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for
Managing the Hidden Threat ofAquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV.
249, 257 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
22 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, UNITED STATES-MEXICO
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER ASSESSMENT ACT, S. REP. No. 108-297, at 8 (2004).
23 See Chdvez, supra note 12, at 238. As of 2003, the populations of the three
cities were: Las Cruces, NM, 78,000; El Paso, TX, 650,000; and Ciudad Juarez,
1.2 million. The population in the region is predicted to reach four million by
2020. Paso Del Norte Water Task Force, What is the Paso Del Norte?,
http://www.sharedwater.org/en/whatIsPDN.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
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grew from 276,995 to 1,040,533.24 Through careful water planning
and conservation measures, El Paso has been able to reduce
pumping of both the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons, but these efforts
do not quiet the concerns of overdraft.
Overdraft of the aquifers is critical because a lack of water
has more implications than the apparent lack of potable water. For
many years the region has been warned that the depletion of
groundwater could force farmers to abandon their agricultural
activities, increase energy consumption from efforts to extract
water from the low water table (i.e., deepen wells), and cause
serious water quality concerns. 26 Today, overdraft of the aquifers
creates serious environmental damage such as land subsidence.
Land subsidence accounts for the damage to homes, urban
infrastructures, and gas and water lines in the area.2 Additionally,
the overdraft of the Hueco Bolson creates problems of salinization
and contamination of the groundwater, resulting in public health
24 Hume, supra note 15, at 192.
25 WILLIAM R. HUTCHINSON, HUECO BOLSON GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS AND
MANAGEMENT IN THE EL PASO AREA: EL PASO WATER SUPPLY, EL PASO WATER
UTILITIES HYDROLOGYREPORT (2004), http://www.epwu.org/water/huecobolson.
html (follow "El Paso Water Supply" hyperlink).26Albert E. Utton, The Development of International Groundwater Law, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 95, 102 (1982) [hereinafter Utton, Development].
27 Land subsidence is the lowering of the land-surface elevation from
changes that take place underground. Common causes of land
subsidence from human activity are pumping water, oil, and gas
from underground reservoirs .... Overdrafting of aquifers is
the major cause of subsidence in the southwestern United States,
and as ground-water pumping increases, land subsidence also will
increase.... The lowering of land surface elevation from this
process is permanent. For example, if lowered ground-water
levels caused land subsidence, recharging the aquifer until
ground water returned to the original levels would not result in
an appreciable recovery of the land-surface elevation.
S.A. Leake, Land Subsidence From Ground-Water Pumping, U.S. Geological
Survey, http://geochange.er.usgs.gov/sw/changes/anthropogenic/subside (last
visited Feb. 18, 2006).
28 S. REP. NO. 108-297, supra note 22, at 8; Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4,
at 373; O'Leary, supra note 6, at 57.
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concerns.29 The water quality is also being threatened by "[Ciudad]
Juarez's disposal of untreated sewage in the Rio Grande."' °
Competition over scarce groundwater could also lead to higher
water costs, the inability to support economic development, and
national security problems.3 '
Thirty years ago, Albert Utton32 advocated the need for
groundwater management and water policies in the region in order
to stop, or at least slow down, these seemingly inevitable results.33
He observed that "[t]he heaviest groundwater users in the United
States are the states which are contiguous to Mexico, and yet,
paradoxically, the law and institutions of these border states are
woefully inadequate to control the exploitation of their groundwa-
ter resources."3 4 The lack of an agreement might best be explained
by the many obstacles that arise in drafting a groundwater
agreement for the regions.35
B. Important Considerations and Challenges with
Transboundary Legal Agreements
Although the Hueco Bolson and Mesilla Bolson are trans-
boundary in nature, spanning New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico,
there is no binational agreement governing allocation and rights to
the groundwater. 36 The lack of a legal solution is caused partly by
29 S. REP. No. 108-297, supra note 22, at 8; HUTCHINSON, supra note 25; Mumme,
Minute 242, supra note 4, at 374.
30 Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 374.
31 Hume, supra note 15, at 192-93; Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 21, at 258.
32 Albert Utton was co-founder of the International Transboundary Resources
Center ("CIRT") and the Natural Resources Center ("NRC") at the University of
New Mexico School of Law. Utton began researching issues related to trans-
boundary groundwater in the region in 1977. O'Leary, supra note 6, at 57 & n.1.
33 Utton, Development, supra note 26, at 102.
3' Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S. -Mexican Water
Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1106 (1982)
[hereinafter Utton, Anticipating].
31 See infra Part I.B for a discussion about the obstacles to an allocation agreement.
36 Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 373-74.
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two main challenges that transboundary groundwater manage-
ment in the region present: political scale and lack of scientific
certainty.37 Further, legal agreements on transboundary ground-
water must include special considerations during the drafting
process, making a final resolution even more elusive.3"
1. Political Scale
Groundwater within the United States falls within the
jurisdiction of the states, which means that the Hueco Bolson and
Mesilla Bolson are governed by the legal system of two states (New
Mexico and Texas), as well as the water law of Mexico.39 New
Mexico uses a system of prior appropriation, granting permits to
those who take the water, while Texas uses a system derived
from common law property rights to regulate water within the
state.4 ° Further, because the aquifers span two nations, there is a
strong presumption that New Mexico and Texas must rely on the
" Political scale and scientific uncertainty are two common themes that produce
challenges to natural resource management. RASBANDETAL.,supra note 1, at 36.
Political scale refers to the situation where a natural resource is located within
two jurisdictions. Id. at 50. Scientific uncertainty is a challenge because laws
and polices are difficult to make when a natural resource is not fully understood.
Id. at 43.
31 See infra Part II.A(3).
31 In the United States, groundwater management is governed by the states,
while in Mexico the groundwater management is centralized. Mumme, Minute
242, supra note 4, at 349. The Mexican Constitution grants landowners the right
to underground water-subject to federal regulation-when the public interest
or other parties' interests so require. Today, Mexico does have national laws that
regulate the use and protection and of groundwater. Hardberger, supra note 4,
at 1243-44.40 Hardberger, supra note 4, at 1240-42. In New Mexico, groundwater is owned
by the state and allocated by a prior appropriation permit system. Permits are
appropriated based on seniority and beneficial use, and permit holders must
make reasonable use of the water. Texas uses a modified version of the capture
doctrine to govern groundwater. The capture doctrine gives a landowner whose
property is above an aquifer an unlimited right to the water. Texas, however,
has limited these rights when the landowner pumps water with malice or
wanton waste. Id.; see also Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 354.
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federal government to enter into any agreement on management
or allocation.4'
Due to these political scale issues, the region has sometimes
been resistant to the idea of an allocation agreement. Another
reason for the resistance is that the states are reluctant to involve
the federal government in their decisions about groundwater
regulation.42 Carlos Marin of the International Boundary and
Water Commission ("IBWC") points out that "states are apprehen-
sive about allowing federal government involvement in the
regulation of groundwater."43 States want to take part in the
process because the national interests that drive the federal
government's decisions may conflict with the interests of the
border states."4 Similarly, in Texas, local communities want to be
in control of groundwater and are apprehensive about too much
state involvement.4 5
Further, even assuming that the federal government must
be involved in an agreement, federal involvement still does not
solve the political scale challenge. The federal government must
determine if it will address all groundwater along the border in
one general agreement, or find separate solutions for each area on
a case-by-case basis. A case-by-case approach that entails basin-
oriented agreements is often advocated by scholars. 46 "[A]t the
41 Hume, supra note 15, at 190. ("The interests of the United States as a whole
might clash with the interests of border region water users in particular
instances.") The presumption that states must rely on the federal government
for an agreement will be challenged in Parts II and III of this Note.
4 2 Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from the Perspective of
the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 35, 39 (2003).
4 3 Id.
44 Hume, supra note 15, at 190.4 5 Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 21, at 251 & n.5. "Notwithstanding the fact that
excessive groundwater withdrawals are a statewide problem, the legislative
sentiment [in Texas] remains strong that groundwater should be managed
locally, if at all." Id. at 253.
4 6 See, e.g., Stephen Mumme & Nicolas Pineda, Water Management on the U.S. -
Mexico Border: Mandate Challenges for Binational Institutions, Summary of a
workshop on The Future of the U.S.-Mexico Border: Population, Development
and Water (2001), http://wilsoncenter.org (search "water management and
mumme" and then choose first hyperlink option).
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diplomatic level we must strive for incremental, case-by-case
solutions to Mexico-U.S. transboundary groundwater problems,
building up a common base of principles, experiences, and prac-
tices that will provide solutions for those remaining problems."47
With "[eighteen] different problems areas scattered across eight
geographic zones,"' it is evident why a case-by-case approach
might be necessary.
2. Scientific Uncertainty
The lack of scientific data on aquifers, and on groundwater
sources in general, poses a challenge to the formation of agree-
ments on allocation.49 "[D]issemination of accurate knowledge
concerning the character, diffusion, availability, and value of the
resource is critical to developing an understanding of the need to
redefine the rules of allocation and management.. , o Although
several binational working groups have contributed to an increase
in scientific knowledge about groundwater and specific aquifers,
much is still unknown.5'
3. Concerns with the Drafting Process and Final Agreement
In addition to the issues of political scale and scientific
uncertainty, an effective legal agreement must address concerns
about both the drafting process and the final agreement. Impor-
tant considerations in the drafting process of a legal agreement are
the "policy development and implementation" of binational agree-
ments, "public accessibility and procedural transparency," and
"inclusion of domestic stakeholders and non-governmental bodies. 52
Any legal agreement reached on the issue also needs to be flexible
47 Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 361.
48 Id. at 344.
'9 See id. at 361; S. REP. No. 108-297, supra note 22, at 10; Hardberger, supra
note 4, at 1214.
50 Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 347.
5lId. at 361.
52 See Mumme & Pineda, supra note 46.
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to ensure the adequate management of the groundwater.53 "The
process of negotiating supplemental agreements, at best, consumes
time and money; at worst, important projects might never be
undertaken because the cost of reaching agreement is prohib-
itive."5 4 The legal solution should also remedy the binational
asymmetry on the border.55 Most importantly, the legal agreement
must be enforceable.56
C. Current and Proposed Solutions Addressing Groundwater
in the Region
Proposed solutions to groundwater management in the
region include implementing new treaties, expanding the scope of
current United States-Mexico legal agreements governing surface
water, and creating new binational efforts to study the region's
groundwater. The most noted solution is the Bellagio Draft Treaty,
written in 1982 by Robert Hayton and Albert Utton in response to
the transboundary groundwater issues on the U.S.-Mexico
border.57 The Bellagio Draft Treaty is a model transboundary
groundwater treaty that establishes the cooperative study and
joint management between two nations to ensure "reasonable and
equitable development" and "optimum utilization and conservation
of transboundary groundwaters." s The treaty also creates a
53 See UTTON & ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 95.
54 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally
Shared Water Sources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property, 26
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 47 (1994).
55 See Hardberger, supra note 4, at 1251-52 (noting that past agreements have
widened the power gap and that since water is a necessary resource, agreements
should fulfill every party's needs). Hardberger also suggests that in order to
come to an adequate agreement, all parties must realize that water is not an
economic resource to be driven by self interest, but is instead necessary for
survival and must therefore be shared. Id. at 1250-52; see also Mumme, Minute
242, supra note 4, at 361; Rodgers & Utton, supra note 6, at 717.56 UTTON & ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 97-98; Dellapenna, supra note 54, at 54-
55; Hardberger, supra note 4, at 1255-56.
7 See Hayton & Utton, supra note 6.
5 8 Id. at 682 (Bellagio Draft Treaty art. II). See generally O'Leary, supra note 6.
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commission that is responsible for assessing scientific data on the
aquifers to aid groundwater management.59 The Bellagio Draft
Treaty has gained much acceptance in the academic community
and is a valuable model agreement for the region.6
Another suggestion, requiring neither a new treaty nor the
creation of a binational body to be implemented, is expanding the
scope of the International Boundary and Water Commission's
Minute 242.61 Minute 242, signed in 1973, includes a provision that
recognizes the need for a "comprehensive agreement on groundwa-
ter in the border areas,"62 but only explicitly governs activity
within certain areas of the Colorado River.63 A suggestion exists
that "Minute 242 arguably brought groundwater within the orbit
of the 1944 Water Treaty, which provides a principled basis for
dialogue and joint action on the somewhat taboo issue of equitable
apportionment."'
The region's groundwater has also been addressed in the
U.S. Senate. The United States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer
Assessment Act, introduced by Senator Bingaman from New
Mexico, addresses several groundwater challenges facing the
region." A report accompanying the proposed Act reiterates the
5 Hayton & Utton, supra note 6, at 684-88.
6 oSee, e.g., Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 359 ("[Ihe Draft Treaty provides
a credible and adaptable template for sustainable management of transboundary
groundwater that links commonly accepted principles of customary international
law to the varied hydrographic, socio-economic, and political circumstances found
in relation to these aquifers."); O'Leary, supra note 6, at 60 ("It is time to take
another look at the provisions of the Bellagio Draft Treaty."); Hardberger, supra
note 4, at 1233 ("The draft treaty.., creates useful guidelines for some important
factors in the formation of international agreements.").
61 See generally Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4.
International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute No. 242: Permanent
and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the
Colorado River, 5 (Aug. 30, 1973) [hereinafter Minute 242].
63 Id.
Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 342.
65 Both the 108th and 109th Congresses passed a version of the Act. See United
States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, S. 1957, 108th Cong.
(engrossed as agreed to or passed by the Senate) (2004) [hereinafter S. 1957];
United States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, S. 214,109th Cong.
(engrossed as agreed to or passed by the Senate) (2005) [hereinafter S. 214].
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fact that "allocation of ground water in the border region is poorly
regulated because little is known about its availability, sustain-
ability, and quality; about how ground water interacts with
surface-water bodies; and about the susceptibility of ground
water to contamination."66 The Act calls for border cooperation in
studying and assessing the availability of water in the aquifers in
order to better allocate the water in the future. 7
While the United States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer
Assessment Act is necessary to address pressing concerns about
the groundwater in the region, it does not address the complex
legal issues surrounding the scarce water in the region, nor does
it attempt to propose temporary legal solutions for allocation. The
report states that the excessive pumping of water in some regions
has not only depleted the aquifers, but has already lowered the
water table, reduced the flow of streams (vital for riparian regions
on the border), created land subsidence, degraded water quality,
affected habitat and biodiversity, and threatened the health of
border residents.69
The issues of groundwater allocation and water quality in
this region require a prompt legal solution. "The alterative to
mutual agreement is continued unilateral taking of these waters,
which is not a sustainable solution."" As described earlier, the
population increase on the border is already leading to concerns of
overdraft and degrading water quality-threatening the future use
of the aquifers.7' The effects of total depletion of the groundwater
could be disastrous and expensive, thus it is necessary to consider
all legal options available to the region.
66 S. REP. No. 108-297, supra note 22, at 8.
67 S. 1957 § 4; S. 214 § 4.
68 The purposes of the bills are to "systematically assess priority transboundary
aquifers" and "provide the scientific foundation necessary for State and local
officials to address pressing water resource challenges in the United States-
Mexico border region." S. 1957 § 2; S. 214 § 2. Once the bill is enacted, the study
will be funded for ten years. S. 214 § 78.
69 S. REP. No. 108-297, supra note 22, at 8.
70 O'Leary, supra note 6, at 58.
71 See supra Part I.A.
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II. FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY AND STATE AND LOCAL
INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
As suggested earlier, the prevailing legal view is that states
cannot enter into legal agreements with foreign nations.7 2 The
notion that the federal government is the only actor in foreign
relations, however, is beginning to change.73 This section begins
with a brief history of the roles of the federal government and the
states in foreign relations matters.74 Next, current trends in
international law and policy will be discussed, with an emphasis
on how the role of states in foreign policy matters has shifted
dramatically.75 Finally, this Part will also address whether states
today have legal support for negotiating and entering into
agreements with foreign states and why it is necessary that states
have the ability to engage in such relations.
A. Federal Exclusivity
1. The Constitution
The history of the federal government's monopoly over
foreign affairs, or the "exclusivity principle,"76 begins with the
United States Constitution and several key Supreme Court
decisions. Article I of the Constitution states that "tIn] o state shall
enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation," 77 and "no state
72 Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 821, 823-24 (1989).
73 See generally id.
74 See infra Part II.A.
71 See infra Part III.B.
76 The term "exclusivity principle" was coined by Peter Spiro and represents the
idea that "the federal government alone enjoys the capacity to conduct the
nation's foreign relations." Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1999).
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The treaty power is further defined in Article II,
§ 2, cl. 2, giving the president the power the make treaties subject to the
Senate's advice and consent.
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shall, without the consent of Congress,... enter into any agree-
ment or compact with another state, or with a foreign power.... ,71
These two provisions were included in the Constitution to constrain
the ability of state and local governments to get involved in foreign
affairs.79 The framers felt that the nation ought to "'speak with one
voice' in foreign relations" so that no one state could produce ad-
verse effects on the entire nation when it acted internationally.8"
Additionally, the framers felt that "uniformity, credibility,
and critical bargaining mass" were important in order for the
United States to form treaties with other countries." Allowing the
states to enter into their own treaties, according to the framers,
would diminish these qualities and threaten the country's interna-
tional capabilities. 2 The framers also felt that uniformity would
promote national pride, which would help in foreign relations
matters.83
However, even though these constitutional provisions limit
the states in foreign affairs matters, the states have always had
some role in shaping the foreign relations of the United States, and
today both state and local involvement is increasing. 8 In fact, the
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
79 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 228 (Foundation
Press 1972) ("The language, the spirit and history of the Constitution deny the
States authority to participate in foreign affairs.") Article VI of the Constitution
further constrains a state's ability to intervene in foreign affairs because when
treaties are the "supreme law of the land," the states are bound by such
international agreements. See U.S. CONST. art. IV; see also Bilder, supra note 72,
at 823.
80 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1224-25 (quoting Bilder, supra note 72, at 827).
81 Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1237 (2000).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 228.
[D]espite many light, flat statements to the contrary, the foreign
relations of the United States are not in fact wholly insulated from
the States, are not conducted exactly as though the United States
were a unitary state. In constitutional theory, the States are not
irrelevant, playing a small part of their own, and even limiting
somewhat the plenary authority of the Federal Government.
2006] 485
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV. [Vol. 30:471
claim that the Constitution prohibits any agreement between a
state and foreign nation has been challenged for centuries.8 5
Justice Story, who sat on the Supreme Court in the early nine-
teenth century, 6 suggested in his commentaries that states might
only be forbidden to enter into treaties with other countries when
they are "treaties of a political character."17 Agreements "deemed
mere private rights of sovereignty," such as boundary issues, might
still be permissible.8 8
2. Early Compact Clause Cases
In Holmes v. Jennison,8 9 the only case to consider how the
Compact Clause9" relates to an agreement between a state and
foreign nation,9 the Supreme Court held that Vermont had
exceeded its authority by attempting to extradite an individual to
Canada.92 The Court first determined that the Compact Clause
prohibits states from entering into various types of agreements, in
85 Id. at 229-30. (distinguishing between a treaty, compact, and agreement, and
noting that "[n]o agreement by a State with a foreign power has been challenged
as a forbidden treaty").
" Justice Story sat on the Supreme Court from 1812 to 1845. DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 362 (7th ed. 2005).87 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 465 (quoting 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1402 (listing
treaties of political character as "treaties of alliance for purposes of peace and
war; and treaties of confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual
government, political cooperation, and the exercise of political sovereignty; and
treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or
external political dependance, or general commercial privileges")).8 8 Id.
89 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). Although the Court only reached a plurality
decision, scholars emphasize that Justice Taney's plurality decision "marked the
effective end of any independent state discretion in extradition" and has been
"reflected in the pronouncements of leading commentators and political actors."
Spiro, supra note 76, at 1231-32.
90 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No state shall, without the consent of
Congress,... enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with
a foreign power. .. ").
91 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 231.
92 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 579 (1840).
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addition to treaties.93 The Court went on to hold that the attempt
to extradite fell within the limitations of the Compact Clause,
construing the clause broadly. 4 The decision also went beyond
explicit constitutional restraints, stating that foreign relations
matters could not be exercised by both the states and the federal
government,95 creating the "dormant theory of federal power over
foreign relations."96 While the Holmes decision seems to firmly
preclude the states from unilaterally forming any agreement with
another country,9" states today are forming such agreements
93 Id. at 571-72.
[T]he states are forbidden to enter into any 'agreement' or
'compact' with a foreign nation; and as these words could not
have been idly or superfluously used by the framers of the
Constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the same thing
with the word treaty. They evidently mean something more, and
were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive.
Id.
saHolmes, 39 U.S. at 572.
[TIhe use of all of these terms, 'treaty,' 'agreement,' 'compact,'
show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that
they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or
communication between a state and a foreign power: and we
shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the
word 'agreement' its most extended signification; and so apply
it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or
informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of
the parties.
Id.95 Id. at 575-79; see also Spiro, supra note 76, at 1231 (describing this prohibition
on states as the "dormant theory of federal power over foreign relations"). Spiro
comments that this "expansive interpretation of [the compact] clause indicated
an even more severe bar against state activity than that comprehended by the
more recent conventional wisdom." Id.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., id.; HENKIN, supra note 79, at 233 (interpreting the decision as
meaning that any "agreement between a State and a foreign authority on any
subject is forbidden unless Congress consents").
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without first obtaining congressional consent,9" which raises
doubts as to whether the federal government has the exclusive
authority to deal with foreign nations.
In addition to state agreements with foreign nations, the
early Supreme Court also considered federal oversight of interstate
compacts. In Virginia v. Tennessee,99 the Court decided an issue of
whether an agreement setting state boundaries was valid despite
the lack of congressional consent.'00 The Court held that the
boundary lines were valid despite the lack of consent, emphasizing
that the Compact Clause "is directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States."'' Because state and foreign
compacts are both addressed in the Compact Clause, Louis Henkin
suggests that the Court's reasoning may extend to an agreement
between a state and a foreign nation, thus a foreign agreement will
not need congressional consent unless it "tends to give a State
elements of international sovereignty, interferes with full and free
exercise of federal authority, or deals locally with a matter on
which there is or might be national policy."' °2 The Restatement of
Foreign Relations also suggests that agreements between a state
and foreign nation do not always need congressional consent.'O3 "In
98 /d.
Whether by so narrowing the constitutional requirement of
Congressional consent, or because consent was assumed, state
and local authorities have in fact entered into agreements and
arrangements with foreign counterparts without seeking
consent of Congress, principally on matters of common local
interest such as the coordination of roads, police cooperation,
and border control.
Id.
99 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
'oo Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517 (1893).
101 Id. at 519.
102 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 233.
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
302 cmt. f (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 Reporter's Note 9 (1987) (citing § 302 cmt. f) ("A State may
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general, agreements involving local transborder issues, such as
agreements to curb a source of pollution, to coordinate police or
sewage services, or to share an energy source, have been consid-
ered not to require congressional consent."' °4
The views of the Supreme Court, Louis Henkin, and the
Restatement of Foreign Relations have surpassed theory and
become reality. Border states have been entering into agreements
with Canada, Mexico, and their local subdivisions for over one-
hundred years.10 5 Thus, it appears that a state's ability to form a
legal agreement with a foreign nation is not completely foreclosed
by the Constitution.
3. The Expansion of Dormant Foreign Affairs
Since Holmes and Virginia v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court
has decided several other cases involving the states' roles in
foreign affairs, often producing inconsistent opinions. In Chy Lung
v. Freeman,"°6 decided thirty-five years after Holmes, the Supreme
Court seemed to further expand the dormant foreign affairs
power.'0 7 At issue in this case was a California statute that limited
make some agreements with foreign governments without the consent of
Congress so long as they do not impinge upon the authority or the foreign
relations of the United States.").
104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
302 cmt. f(1987).
10' Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN
POL'Y 154, 157-58 (1986-87) (listing "road and bridge oversight, electric power,
water management, motor vehicle registration, civil defense, fire prevention,
and border patrols" as issues of such agreements).
106 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
lo7Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). But see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
Looking at the clause in which the terms 'compact' or
'agreement' appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed
to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of
political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.
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immigration of individuals into the state.'0 8 Despite the lack of
any federal immigration statutes, the Court held that such
powers were reserved for the federal government.' 9 Over seventy
years later, however, in Clark v. Allen, 110 the Court upheld a state
statute that permitted non-resident aliens to inherit property
only if a reciprocal right existed for United States citizens in the
alien's nation of origin."' The Court stated that even though the
law "will have some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries.., that is true of many state laws which none would claim
cross the forbidden line.""2 Almost a century later, in Zschernig v.
Id. Louis Henkin concludes that
[s]ince the same language applies to foreign compacts, one might
adapt the Court's distinction and conclude that Congressional
consent is required only if a foreign agreement tends to give a
State elements of international sovereignty, interferes with full
exercise of federal authority, or deals locally with a matter on
which there is or might be national policy.
HENKIN, supra note 79, at 233.
108 Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 277-78.
'
09 Id. at 280
The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress,
and not to the States. It has the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of those
regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs
solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single
State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels
with other nations.
Id.
110 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
1' Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. at 506 n.1 (1947).
112 Id. at 517. The Court also cited to Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901), a
similar case from 1901, stating:
California had granted aliens an unqualified right to inherit
property within its borders. The alien claimant was a citizen of
Great Britain with whom the United States had no treaty
providing for inheritance by aliens in this country. The
argument was that a grant of rights to aliens by a State was, in
absence of a treaty, a forbidden entry into foreign affairs. The
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Miller,"3 the Supreme Court again returned to imposing limita-
tions on a state's ability to engage in foreign relations. At issue in
Zschernig was an Oregon inheritance law, similar to the law in
Clark, which denied an East German national from inheriting an
estate because East Germany did not permit Americans to inherit
estates in Germany." 4 The Court held that the application of the
Oregon inheritance law was an "intrusion by the State into the
field of foreign affairs" and was therefore unconstitutional."1
5
In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the
potential consequences of giving offense were obvi-
ously profound. One could not expect the Soviets
necessarily to understand that when a state official
spoke, it was not for the nation; or at least one would
not want to risk error in assessing that perception...
[Alt worst, one could plausibly draw a scenario in
which offense caused by state action lit the fuse to
World War 111.116
In holding that a state statute violated the Constitution if
it impacted foreign affairs, the Zschernig Court expanded the
dormant affairs doctrine. 1 7 Interestingly, however, Zschernig did
not overrule Clark."' The Court reasoned that because the Oregon
inheritance law put a large burden on the nonresident to establish
Court rejected the argument as being an extraordinary one. The
objection to the present statute is equally farfetched.
Id.
113 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
114 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1968).
115 Id. at 432.
116 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1242.
117 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 239 (1972). "There was no relevant exercise of
federal power and no basis for deriving any prohibition by 'interpretation' of the
silence of Congress and the President. The Court tells us that the Constitution
itself excludes such state intrusions even when the federal branches have not
acted." Id.
118 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
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reciprocity, whereas Clark only involved a general reciprocity
statute, the Oregon law was more intrusive on foreign affairs."9
The Zschernig decision has been controversial. 2 ' Some
scholars believe that the harshness of the Zschernig decision, and
the "high mark of federal exclusivity" in general, are best ex-
plained by the context of the Cold War. 2 ' Even people who agree
with the federal exclusivity principle believe that the decision may
be too extreme,122 and this may attenuate the impact that the case
has today.
Yet over a decade later, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 23 the Court again adopted a dormant foreign affairs
position, striking down a state regulation that taxed foreign
goods.' 24 The Court was concerned that one state's actions could
prompt retaliation against the entire United States.'25 The Japan
Line decision, however, has also been explained by its temporal
context; Zschernig was decided during the Cold War, while Japan
119 Id. at 434-35 ("[W]e would be required to do [more] here to uphold the Oregon
statute as applied; for it has more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries,' and its great potential for disruption or embarrassment
makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic bagatelle."). Louis
Henkin draws upon the tone of the laws to give further insight into the
differences between Clark and Zschernig: "it may be, then, that Zschernig v.
Miller excludes only state actions that reflect a state policy critical of foreign
governments and involve a 'sitting in judgment' on them." HENKIN, supra note
79, at 240.
120 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1242.
121 Id. at 1241.
122 See id. at 1242.
123 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
124 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 437 (1979).
125 Id. at 448.
A state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may
impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity
is essential. Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of
national concern. "In international relations and with respect to
foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act





Line was decided during a time when "trade wars loomed in
economic relations even between friendly states."126 Although the
case law on foreign affairs exclusivity seems unyielding to states
engaged in foreign affairs, the reality today is that states are
involved in international issues more than ever before, and the
federal government has not made such actions difficult.
B. State and Local Involvement in Foreign Affairs
Today, both state and local governments are becoming key
players in foreign affairs matters traditionally viewed as off-
limits. 127 For example, states are taking it upon themselves to
engage in international trade and investments. 128 In fact, in 1999
it was estimated that "[olne in six private sector jobs in the United
States [was] linked to the global economy." 129 Over forty states had
already established trade or investment offices abroad in 1989.130
"Without local management, the movement of people and goods
across borders would be slower and more expensive and problems
such as illegal immigration and drug traffic would be even worse
than they are today."' 3 ' Even before the emergence of the global
economy, states had an effect on the international market. Today,
that impact is just more prevalent.'32 Along with trading and
investments, localities often enter into agreements with border
communities for cultural reasons. In the 1980s, over 750 communi-
ties in the U.S. had over 1,000 sister city relations with cities in
foreign nations.'33 With all of this activity, it is not surprising that
121 See Spiro, supra note 76, at 1242-43.
127 Bilder, supra note 72, at 821-22 (noting that such actions have received little
reaction by the federal government).
128 Curtis A. Bradley, Symposium Overview: A New American Foreign Affairs
Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1999).
129 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1248.
13o Bilder, supra note 72, at 822.
" Shuman, supra note 105, at 158.
132 Swaine, supra note 81, at 1130.
133 Shuman, supra note 105, at 159.
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municipal foreign policies "can no longer be dismissed as simply
aberrant, trivial, or unconstitutional." 34
State and local involvement in foreign affairs permeates all
aspects of society today. The tremendous impact that state and
local governments have on foreign affairs is exemplified by local
community actions. Local community involvement in foreign
affairs, or "municipal foreign policies," 3 ' takes the form of
"consciousness-raising measures, unilateral measures, and
bilateral measures."'36 The activities include "establish [ing]
permanent foreign-policy bodies," 3 v entering into bilateral
agreements, and introducing "international affairs-related
curricula in . . . public schools." 3s Increased action in all three
categories reveals that the federal government might permit local
or state governments to enter into transboundary groundwater
allocation agreements without federal oversight. 139
Most local governments are involved in conscious-raising
activities related to foreign affairs,' 40 which can involve activ-
ities such as establishing educational programs' 4 ' or lobbying.1 42
134 Id. at 155.
135 "The term 'municipal foreign policy'-used by both advocates and critics of
local involvement-suggests a purpose, significance and continuity that few of
these state and local activities warrant." Bilder, supra note 72, at 829.
136 Shuman, supra note 105, at 159.
137 Id. at 161.
13 8 Id. at 159.
139 In addition to these three categories, in which states are the primary actors,
the federal government today has used states as a shield to international law
compliance. One key area in which the federal government has explicitly allowed
the states to shape foreign affairs is the death penalty. See discussion infra on
the federal government's resistance to intervene when states refuse to follow
international law.
140 Shuman, supra note 105, at 159 (adding that local governments are involved
"whether they realize it or not").
141 Id. at 160 (giving examples of "peace studies" courses implemented in high
schools in New York and Massachusetts which were designed to teach the
effects of nuclear war and anti-communism programs implemented during the
Cold War).
142 Id. (giving lobbying examples such as efforts by mayors to persuade other
mayors not to do business with investment firms doing business with South
Africa during Apartheid, protesting to show concern for human rights).
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Unilateral actions arise when a city uses its police powers to shape
foreign policy. 43 For example, after an incident in which the Soviet
Union shot down a South Korean airplane, some U.S. cities denied
United Nations representatives from the Soviet Union access to
their airports and even banned the sale of vodka from the Soviet
Union in protest.'" Further, by the mid-1980s over one-hundred
cities had become nuclear free zones, passing zoning ordinances to
prohibit the building of nuclear weapons within their city.'45 Cities
also use their police powers to establish economic sanctions against
nations that violate human rights.4 Several cities either penal-
ized firms engaging in business with South Africa, or refused to
contract with companies that make nuclear weapons.
14 7
The most obvious example of a city government impacting
foreign affairs occurs when a city engages in bilateral activities
with another city, such as formally entering into a bilateral
agreement with another nation or city. Several U.S. cities have
formed agreements with foreign cities to help establish preschools
or give humanitarian aid.14 Some cities form permanent bodies to
deal with foreign relations,149 while others participate in foreign
affairs on a more ad hoc basis, establishing foreign policy as issues
arise. 5 ° Seattle, for example, established a permanent interna-
tional affairs office to oversee issues of trade, tourism, and sister
city relations.' 5 '
State and local involvement in foreign affairs raises a
variety of legal issues depending on the activity in question.'5 2
Activities that fall under the consciousness-raising category create
only one legal concern: "[clan a local government undertake
143 Id. at 160-61.
144 d at 160.
145 Id. at 160-61.
146 Shuman, supra note 105, at 161.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. (calling these bodies "miniature state departments").
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Bilder, supra note 72, at 829.
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education, research, and lobbying that challenge the foreign
policies of the federal government?"'53 While the federal govern-
ment may have a national interest in curtailing such efforts, these
activities involve free speech and vital political functions and it is
therefore important, and likely, that they continue. 15 4 But foreign
affairs activities within the unilateral and bilateral categories
raise constitutional issues that could restrict states and localities
through the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and dor-
mant foreign affairs preemption. 5' The Supreme Court decisions
discussed earlier emphasize such constitutional limits through
the Court's striking down of state attempts to regulate areas of
international importance. 56
When a state partakes in bilateral actions with other nations,
such as a groundwater allocation agreement, a further constitu-
tional question arises as to whether such an agreement is an
impermissible treaty or compact in violation of the Constitution. 57
[Wihether an agreement or compact requires Con-
gressional consent will often be determined by the
State. If it proceeds without consent, and if Congress
learned of it and were moved to act to reject it,
Congress would doubtless prevail, but ordinarily the
States's judgment would not be reviewed unless some
aggrieved private interest challenged the agreement
in court.
5 8
Thus, the question is whether such an agreement would prevail if
challenged by an aggrieved party.
Some scholars challenge the federal government's exclusive
right to make treaties. Although it has been noted that "we should
be more hesitant to scale down affirmative federal powers than
153 Shuman, supra note 105, at 162.
15 Bilder, supra note 72, at 829.
155 See Shuman, supra note 105, at 163-68.
156 See supra Part II.A(2).
157 Shuman, supra note 105, at 168.
158 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 233-34.
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dormant ones,"'59 certain issues do not necessarily need to be
debated in Washington.' One example particularly relevant to
the groundwater debate is the famous (or infamous) Migratory
Bird treaty between the United States and Canada.' Supreme
Court precedent 62 reminds us that states' rights are subject to the
federal government's right to make treaties protecting migratory
species, but some challenge the necessity of such treaties today.'63
A foreign nation "can communicate directly with [states] and, if
necessary, apply discrete pressures to further its interests.""
What called for a traditional bi-national treaty in past scenarios
can today be replaced with multistate commissions or other
agreements between a foreign nation and an individual state.165
The law, in fact, seems to be moving in the direction of permitting
states and local governments to engage in foreign affairs.'66 The
idea of federal exclusivity is losing support for several reasons,
such as the intertwining of domestic and international affairs, the
end of the Cold War, and the expansion of international law.
167
The federal government has tolerated state and local
government attempts to impact foreign affairs, and also has
"deferred to and in some cases abetted, such policies." 68 One
example of extreme deference by the federal government is its
refusal to intervene when states violate international law.169 This
159 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1273.
160Id.
161 See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
162 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
163 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1272-73.
'" Id. at 1272.
165 Id. at 1272-73.
166 Bradley, supra note 128, at 1104-05 ("the new law appears more tolerant of
state involvement in foreign affairs, more willing to impose limits on the
national government's exercise of power, and less reliant on the judiciary to
maintain a foreign affairs uniformity").167 Id. at 1105.
168 Sarah H. Cleveland, Symposium: Crosby and the One-Voice Myth in U.S.
Foreign Affairs Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 1001 (2001).
169 See id. at 1001; Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the
States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 506
(2004); Bradley, supra note 128, at 1098.
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issue came to a forefront when several states failed to follow the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 17' and imposed the
death penalty on foreign nationals despite their failure to abide by
the Convention's consular rights. 171 A preliminary injunction was
issued by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to stop the
executions while the merits were pending in the court. 172 The
United States, however, refused to comply with the order, claiming
that it was beyond the scope of federal authority to order the states
to comply with the ICJ ruling because criminal punishment was a
matter left solely to the states. 173 This opinion is inconsistent with
the federal exclusivity principle and seems to promote state involve-
ment in matters that affect foreign policy, at least when the issue is
one where states have traditional jurisdiction. 174 Groundwater
control, like criminal justice, is an issue within the jurisdiction of
the states.
In addition to court proceedings regarding violations of
international law, the federal government has explicitly deferred
to the states when ratifying certain treaties.
170 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(1963). Article 36 of the Convention requires that countries who have arrested
foreign nationals contact the consular of the foreign national's home nation, as
well as notify the foreign national that he has the right to contact his nation's
consular representative. Id.
171 See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9).
172 See id.
173 Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 684 (1998)
(citing the government's amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court); see also Ku,
supra note 169, at 506-21.
174 Ku, supra note 169, at 520.
While it is true that states appear to hold discretion over certain
foreign policy questions in such circumstances, the reason the
states hold that power is because the foreign policy question
directly implicates a matter of state control . . .such state
intervention in foreign policy issues is tolerated because the
interest in maintaining state authority over such domestic




In ratifying recent human rights conventions, such as
the Genocide and Torture Conventions, the Convention
Against Race Discrimination and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United
States expressly adopted federalism declarations and
understandings that delegated responsibility for cer-
tain U.S. international human rights obligations to
the states. 17
5
These examples demonstrate the international community's in-
creased involvement with individual states, the federal govern-
ment's diminishing concerns of foreign retaliation, the states'
willingness to be involved with the international community and
intervene in foreign affairs, and the federal government's approval
of states abiding by international agreements on their own.
Instead of addressing their concerns with the federal
government, the international community has chosen to place the
individual states at the forefront of the debate. Countries with
nationals on death row have sent communications directly to the
states, moving beyond communications on only the national
level.' 6 "These efforts all evince a clear international understand-
ing that both the problem and the solution for death penalty
excesses will be found in the states."'77 In addition to specific
pleas for clemency, the international community has also
suggested plans to penalize those states that employ the death
penalty. One such example is the European Parliament's proposal
175 Cleveland, supra note 168 at 1003. See, e.g., U.S. RESERVATIONS,
UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DECLARATION CONCERNING THE 1996 COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. REP. No. 102-23, at Understanding 5 (2d Sess. 1992)
("The proposed understanding serves to emphasize domestically that there is no
intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority between the State and
Federal governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to 'federalize'
matters now within the competence of the States.").
17 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1262-63.
177 Id. at 1263.
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that death penalty states in the U.S. be boycotted when it comes
to investing.
178
These actions by foreign nations demonstrate not only that
states are increasingly becoming players on the international
front, but also that the federal government should have less
concern over country-wide retaliations. "[T]he existence of this
system strongly supports the constitutional legitimacy of a robust
and independent state role in fulfilling international law obliga-
tions, and perhaps even participating in foreign relations."79 In
fact, the federal government's refusal to intervene despite the
ICJ's requests is perhaps an explicit example that the federal
government's past justifications for maintaining exclusive powers
in foreign affairs are waning.' The international community
today appears to not only understand the federal system in the
United States, but also that one state's actions are not necessarily
attributable to the federal government or the entire country as
a whole.'
The federal government has become increasingly tolerant of
state and local involvement in foreign affairs. Today, the justifica-
tions behind the dormant foreign affairs power of the federal
government may be outdated,"s2 and globalization has encouraged
178Id.
179 Ku, supra note 169, at 461.
1 o Edward Swaine, however, suggests that such acts by the federal government
might not signify that the federal government has transferred international
relations powers to the states. "The federal government has not really yielded
its international role to the states. Failures to preempt state foreign relations
activities might signal genuine agreement with a state's position, an inability to
intervene due to political or administrative constraints, or simply opposition to
preemption as a matter of principle." Swaine, supra note 81, at 1237.
181 See Spiro, supra note 76, at 1261.
182 However, these same reasons given over two centuries ago to support
exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs are still important considerations
today. See id. at 1247. "[Blecause [states] do not shoulder the consequences of
their actions, [they] will not take into account those consequences in the
decision-making balance. [This will lead to further] information deficiencies




localities to become involved in matters abroad. Additionally, the
types of foreign activities that state and local governments are
engaging in today are beyond those imagined during the drafting
of the Constitution and early Supreme Court decisions. Globaliza-
tion has brought foreign relations to the local level. Not only have
trading and investing expanded the discourse between nations,
they have increased relations between sub-national entities. 183
States also sign agreements with foreign nations and take part in
international summits."S Numerous constraints on business would
occur if the federal government denied individual states the ability
to speak for themselves in the foreign markets.
III. FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY, THE LIMITS ON STATE AND LOcAL
TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENTS, AND THE CASE FOR MORE
STATE AND LOCAL CONTROL
As discussed in Part I, the cities of El Paso, Las Cruces, and
Juarez must address the groundwater situation in their regions.8 5
The various proposals previously set forth by scholars were based
on the assumption that any agreement between these cities, or
even between Mexico, Texas, and New Mexico, requires involve-
ment of the federal government."8 6 Federal involvement, however,
generates feelings of resistance and apprehension by the states. 8 7
Thus, the region might best be served by proceeding without the
federal government. The question then becomes whether a regional
18 Id. at 1248 ("Most states now maintain at least one trade office abroad;
many have concluded trade-related agreements with foreign entities; and the
foreign trade mission has become a standard responsibility for governors and
large-city mayors.").
184 Swaine, supra note 81, at 1130.
'
85 UrroN & ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 72-73; Utton, Development, supra note
26, at 102.
186 Proposed solutions to groundwater management in the region include
implementing new treaties, expanding the scope of current United States-
Mexico legal agreements governing surface water, and creating new binational
efforts to study the region's groundwater. See supra Part I.C.
187 Marin, supra note 42, at 39.
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approach to groundwater management, absent any federal control
or oversight, is both within the bounds of the Constitution and also
good policy."' 8 Drawing upon Supreme Court precedent, this
section first discusses the constitutionality of such an agreement,
and will then go on to discuss the possible positive and negative
impacts of a regional agreement.
A. Possible Legal Constraints on State or Local Allocation
Agreements
Any regional agreement made by a state or local govern-
ment falls into the bilateral category of municipal foreign affairs.
Thus, a regional agreement will raise constitutional issues, such
as whether it is an impermissible treaty or is preempted by the
federal exclusivity principle.8 9
Drawing upon the early Compact Clause cases in the
Supreme Court, a regional groundwater agreement is arguably
constitutional. In Holmes,90 the Court determined that states were
188 This Note will not explore the issue of whether the federal government can
actively enter into a treaty or enact a statute to control or allocate the
groundwater in this region. Because the aquifers are located within two U.S.
states and another nation, the assumption is that the federal government has
jurisdiction to create such laws. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982), held that inter-state groundwater is subject
to congressional allocation because it is an article of commerce. This Note will
instead explore whether a regional agreement, absent state intervention or other
conflicting federal laws, is constitutional. Many scholars have challenged the
federal government's monopoly over foreign affairs, but have limited the issue
to whether "the federal government may exclude the states from foreign affairs
only through the exercise of a specific power, such as the treaty or legislative
power, delegated to Congress or the President." Ku, supra note 169, at 471
(citing to two "revisionist scholars," Professor Ramsey and Professor Goldsmith).
Thus, the test is whether a federal court would uphold such an agreement if a
party challenged its interpretation or validity.
189 The notion that the federal exclusivity principle is based on constitutional law
has been challenged. See Spiro, supra note 76, at 1260 ("The exclusivity principle
is ultimately premised not in a rule of constitutional law but in a rule of
international law and the construction of international society.").
190 Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571-72. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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limited from entering into various types of agreements with foreign
entities, but in Virginia v. Tennessee,191 the Court began to clarify
what types of agreements require Congressional approval. The test
set forth in Virginia v. Tennessee, and applied to foreign agree-
ments by the Restatement and scholars, is whether the agreement
"increase[s] [the] political power in the States" or "encroach[es]
upon or interfere[s] with the just Supremacy of the United
States."192
First, because groundwater is controlled by state and local
governments in the United States, a regional groundwater
agreement would not interfere with any existing right of the
federal government, nor does it seem to increase the power of the
state or local community. The examples of valid agreements
between a state and foreign nation given by the Restatement of
Foreign Relations 9 3 are also similar to an agreement on groundwa-
ter allocation. Allocating groundwater is comparable to establish-
ing pollution controls, coordinating police efforts, and sharing
energy sources. All involve areas that are at least partly within the
jurisdiction of the state, and that require cooperation to success-
fully address the issue. Groundwater allocation is also similar to
the Restatement examples in that it could still give rise to a legal
challenge. Mexico could potentially become an aggrieved party,
wanting to sue Texas or New Mexico if denied its fair share of
water; the same could occur if a party does not abide by agreed-
upon pollution controls or coordinated energy or sewage policies.
A regional groundwater agreement can also survive an
application of the foreign affairs exclusivity or dormant foreign
affairs cases.'94 These cases raised the same concerns as the
191 148 U.S. 503 (1893). See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
192 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519. See discussion supra at text
accompanying note 99.
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
302 cmt. f (1987). See discussion supra at text accompanying note 104.194 See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); Clark v. Allen, 33 U.S.
503 (1947); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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Compact Clause cases, thus the analysis is much the same."' The
Supreme Court in these cases engaged in balancing tests to
determine if the state action was constitutional, and were very
much driven by the content and context of the activity.'96 Compar-
ing a groundwater agreement to the immigration statute in Chy
Lung, obvious differences arise. In addition to the basic fact that
a groundwater agreement between two consenting parties is
different from a statute that is imposed upon a foreign nation with
no control over the drafting process, immigration is more of a
federal issue than is groundwater. A groundwater allocation
agreement will directly impact only those regions that rely upon
the transboundary aquifers, and will have no direct impact on the
nation as a whole. In contrast to issues like immigration, ground-
water allocation can be specific to the affected aquifers and
localities. Thus, the agreement will not create national policy or
even the appearance of a national policy, hence it will not interfere
with the nation's overall foreign policy goals.
Immigration has traditionally been reserved to the federal
government, 197 but the location of natural resources within a state
traditionally gives that state the exclusive rights to exploit that
resource, even over federal government attempts to intervene. 9
8
While recent natural resource management policies have subjected
groundwater to federal controls, these regulations have not
195 See supra Part II.A(3).
' See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429; Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434.
197 Hiroshi Motormura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1371-72 (1999) ("[Tlhe
early . . . cases established a pattern of discourse that conceptualized
immigration control as a matter of national sovereignty, including national self-
preservation against foreign threats .... This view of immigration control, in
turn, made immigration a matter of foreign affairs.").
198 See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 1, at 161-82, 727-94. Today, the federal
government hasjurisdiction over state natural resources through the Commerce
Clause. The federal government can explicitly pass regulations when the
resource is an article of interstate commerce, and a court can invalidate a state
regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce. Id. at 164-80; see




touched the issue of allocation.' Further, the immigration statute
in Chy Lung was a more generalized policy that gave the state of
California the ability to exclude immigrants for various reasons.
Understandably, the Court fears "disastrous quarrels with
other nations.""' A regional groundwater agreement, however, will
only impact one other foreign nation and will not give state or local
governments significant discretionary powers. While national
security is a concern if water on the border is not managed and
each state begins a race to the bottom, a groundwater allocation
agreement may actually prevent such a national security crisis. An
agreement between the regional governments on the border that
is based upon mutual understanding and equal rights will not only
prevent unnecessary overdraft, but will also encourage, if not
create, a peaceful distribution of this vital resource.
Further, even though Zschernig limits state and local govern-
ments more than Chy Lung, a groundwater agreement is still
much different from an inheritance prohibition on foreign nation-
als from non-reciprocating countries. 20' Additionally, because the
Court decided Zschernig at a time of heightened of national
security concerns, it is reasonable to assume that a court today
would validate a similar inheritance law.20 2 Yet even if such a law
still violates the Constitution, a groundwater agreement is distin-
guishable, as "Zschernig v. Miller excludes only state actions that
reflect a state policy critical of foreign governments and involve
'sitting in judgement' on them."20 3
199 See John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater,
11 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 5-7 (2004) (listing, for example, the
Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act). Leshy's article advocates for
more federal involvement in groundwater management. Id. But see Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (holding that inter-state groundwater is subject
to congressional allocation because it is an article of commerce).200 Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280. A regional groundwater agreement will have even
less of an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries," than the inheritance
law in Clark v. Allen. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
201 See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 113-22.
20 2 See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 120-22.
203 HENKIN, supra note 79, at 240.
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Even if the validity of a regional groundwater agreement is
not supported by current case law, there is evidence that the case
law is evolving. The changing nature of domestic and international
law also supports the validity of a regional agreement.2 4 The
federal exclusivity principle is based upon several assumptions
that may not remain true today.2"5 First, the Constitution was
drafted against the backdrop of the failing Articles of Confedera-
tion.2 °6 The federal government had good reason to fear that
treaties between states and other nations would diminish the
already vulnerable federal power and credibility of one uniform
nation.20 7 Since the founding of the Constitution, the federal
government has become internally stable and has gained credibil-
ity with other nations.20 8 Further, the federal exclusivity principle
has been supported by fears that foreign nations might retaliate
against the nation as a whole for acts by one state.20 9 The federal
government had an incentive to control the actions of the states
because the doctrine of state responsibility in international law
allows an aggrieved nation to challenge the federal government for
state actions.2 10 While the doctrine of state responsibility is still
part of international law, foreign nations today are beginning to
hold subnational actors responsible for their own acts.21' Addition-
ally, in the recent instances where foreign nations have expressed
concern or actually retaliated, many of the state acts involved
crucial human rights concerns.2 2 And even in the face of such
204 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1260-61.
21 5 Id.; Swaine, supra note 81, at 1237-42.
206 Id. at 1237.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 437 (1979);
Spiro, supra note 76, at 1224-25.210 Id. at 1260.
211 Id. at 1261 ("International society is being reconstructed to include sub-
national actors as legal entities distinct from their national governments. To the
extent this development is perfected, the basis for federal exclusivity over
foreign relations slips away.").212 Id. (listing Proposition 187 and imposition of the death penalty on juveniles
or defendants not afforded treaty rights as examples).
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retaliation, the federal government has not always chosen to
intervene.213 Further, as described earlier, state and local govern-
ments are becoming key players in the global community.214
B. The Impact of State or Local Agreements on the Region
and the Nation
A state or city agreement with Mexico or the city of Juarez
raises many policy considerations, both positive and negative, for
both the state and local communities and the nation as a whole.215
A regional groundwater agreement may be legal, but whether it is
good policy is a separate question. The policy issues raised by such
an agreement span from the classic political scale concerns in
natural resource management to the policy concerns behind the
federal foreign affairs exclusivity.
A regional groundwater agreement is attractive because the
states of Texas and New Mexico and the cities of El Paso and Las
Cruces are more attached to the underlying issues. "States, and
particularly local communities, are typically closer to the problem,
often understand it better, and have to live with the consequences
of the policy."2"6 An agreement binding the region's water sources
should involve those parties most affected by such an agreement.
Because the state and local communities have a personal stake in
ensuring adequate management of the aquifers, a regional
211 After the passing of Proposition 187 in California, a federal court immediately
enjoined the law, but the federal government refused to intervene in the death
penalty instances. See id.214 See supra Part II.B.; see also Spiro, supra note 76, at 1249 ("If they stood as
independent nations, seven American states would be counted among the top
twenty-five countries in terms of gross domestic product.").
215 This section will treat state and city agreements the same and will not
distinguish between these two types of regional and non-federal agreements. An
interesting topic that is not explored in this Note is whether an agreement
between New Mexico or Texas and Mexico would be more constitutional and better
public policy than an agreement between El Paso or Las Cruces and Mexico.
216 RASBAND ET AL., supra note 1, at 52.
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agreement increases potential for achieving its management goals.
Further, a sense of entitlement to the groundwater may also give
the localities an incentive to protect the resources. Such a sense of
entitlement, however, may also lead to an agreement that does not
take full account of conservation issues.217 Self-interest can be both
an asset and a liability. The regional governments may be driven
to allocate more water than necessary to their own jurisdiction in
order to benefit their local economies.218
Much of these same concerns are also found within the
exclusivity principle. State and local governments will not feel the
consequences and effects of their international actions in entirety,
thus their decision-making processes might be flawed and could
impose negative externalities upon other state and local govern-
ments.2 19 State and local governments are criticized for their
involvement in foreign affairs because they are believed to lack
expertise, information and resources. 22' But a regional groundwa-
ter agreement does not require foreign policy expertise-it requires
scientific expertise. 221 Federal, state, and local governments alike
can hire scientists to explore the aquifers. Even though an
agreement with a foreign entity has the potential to impede or
frustrate the national policy of the United States,222 a regional
groundwater agreement should be viewed as an advancement of
the regional interest in protecting the groundwater. Like other
state actions that impact foreign policy, its "purpose is simply to
promote legitimate local concerns and interests and to express the
2171 d. (describing how a sense of entitlement to a natural resource might lead to
the belief that the use can be continued despite other concerns).218 Id. at 53.
219 Bilder, supra note 72, at 827.
220 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1247 ("Indeed, a standard lament of state-level
foreign policy activity is that it is based on insufficient expertise.").
221 In fact, it is noted that in general "the kinds of international matters and
issues with which state and local governments are concerned do not require
special expertise or information." Bilder supra note 72, at 829 (listing examples
such as sister city relationships and local trade).
222 See id. at 827.
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views of their citizens on... issues of relevance and importance to
them."223 In addition, such an agreement may benefit relations
between Mexico and the United States, especially when it comes
to the water crisis on the border.224
A regional groundwater agreement also raises concerns that
Mexico might retaliate against the United States, individual
states, or local governments. Although the international commu-
nity as a whole might understand the federalist nature of the U.S.,
retaliation by foreign governments has not been entirely elimi-
nated.225 When Virginia failed to follow the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, it was the United States who had to defend
itself at the International Court of Justice.226 But such retaliation
has also been directed at the responsible state.2 7 For example,
after California passed Proposition 187, Mexico threatened that it
would take its California business to other states.228 In addition,
nations who disapprove of the death penalty for juvenile offenders
directed their concerns to state governors. A groundwater agree-
ment most likely will not produce such retaliation on a national
level. The agreement will be specific to certain aquifers and will
not directly impact citizens outside of the region. This limited
scope means that the state or city parties will not be able to impose
policies or laws on new parties that have not already agreed to the
terms of the agreement. Further, groundwater allocation, at least
currently, seems to raise fewer human rights concerns than the
death penalty; thus a breach of an allocation agreement will likely
prompt more tempered reactions.
Unlike the state actions listed above, a regional agreement
will be an agreement. As a party to the agreement, Mexico or
223 See id. at 828.
224 See id.
225 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1261.
226 See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
228 Spiro, supra note 76, at 1261-62.
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Juarez will be able to address its concerns before such an agree-
ment is finalized, thus minimizing, if not eliminating, the negative
impacts on the community. A unilateral action by a state is much
different than a bilateral agreement, thus it can realistically be
expected that Mexico or Juarez will not have reason to penalize
non-parties. However, this assumes that the parties will have
addressed the drafting concerns listed in Part I,229 such as bina-
tional symmetry.
A regional groundwater agreement can encompass the
procedural and drafting concerns listed earlier. A regional
agreement is consistent with the basin-oriented approach advo-
cated by scholars.23 ° An advantage of local or state control is that
the groundwater agreement can be tailored to the specific aquifer
concerns in the region. An "incremental, case-by-case solution
•..,,231 could be achieved with a federal plan with, for example, the
implementation of local commissions. Such a plan, however, might
lack the necessary flexibility to address changes and new infor-
mation. Additionally, a more local approach can better ensure that
the community has the opportunity to participate in the agreement
process.
A regional groundwater agreement for the El Paso, Las
Cruces, and Ciudad Juarez region is a viable option. Today,
bilateral agreements between states and other nations do not
violate the Constitution or trigger the dormant foreign affairs
principle. Further, a regional agreement is an attractive option for
the groundwater crisis because the benefits outweigh the inciden-
tal negative impacts to national foreign policy, and the local
community is adequately equipped to address such pressing
concerns.
229 See supra Part I.B.
230 See Mumme, Minute 242, supra note 4, at 353,361; Mumme & Pineda, supra
note 46. See also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.




Groundwater in the El Paso, Las Cruces, and Ciudad Juarez
region is a valuable resource that is threatened by the lack of
adequate transboundary groundwater management. An agreement
addressing allocation and other groundwater management
concerns is necessary for the future. "[T]he alterative to mutual
agreement is continued unilateral taking of these waters, which is
not a sustainable solution."" 2 Because the groundwater is located
within two states and two nations, past approaches have included
the federal government as a key player. But states today are
becoming increasingly involved in foreign policy, and case law
reveals that the federal government is not always a necessary
party for bilateral agreements. A regional groundwater agreement,
absent federal involvement, is a viable option.
232 O'Leary, supra note 6, at 58.
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